Valuing Product Innovation: Genetically Engineered Varieties in U.S. Corn and Soybeans by Ciliberta, Federico et al.
CARD Working Papers CARD Reports and Working Papers 
12-2017 
Valuing Product Innovation: Genetically Engineered Varieties in 
U.S. Corn and Soybeans 
Federico Ciliberta 
University of Virginia 
Giancarlo Moschini 
Iowa State University, moschini@iastate.edu 
Edward D. Perry 
Kansas State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers 
 Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ciliberta, Federico; Moschini, Giancarlo; and Perry, Edward D., "Valuing Product Innovation: Genetically 
Engineered Varieties in U.S. Corn and Soybeans" (2017). CARD Working Papers. 615. 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/615 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CARD Reports and Working Papers at Iowa State 
University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in CARD Working Papers by an authorized 
administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu. 
Valuing Product Innovation: Genetically Engineered Varieties in U.S. Corn and 
Soybeans 
Abstract 
We develop and estimate a discrete-choice model of differentiated products for the corn and soybean 
seed industry in the United States to assess the welfare impact of genetically engineered (GE) crop 
varieties. We use a unique dataset, spanning the period 1996-2011, that contains rich information on the 
adoption of GE traits. Using a two-level nested logit model, we estimate that U.S. farmers are willing to 
pay a significant premium for GE traits, and this value has increased over time. Over the last five years of 
the sample, our results imply that farmers’ average willingness to pay for glyphosate tolerance in 
soybeans was $24/acre/year. During the same period, farmers’ willingness to pay for a common triple-
stack in corn that includes two insect resistance traits and glyphosate tolerance was $35/acre/year. To 
compute overall welfare estimates, we evaluate counterfactual scenarios in which GE varieties are not 
available, with counterfactual non-GE seed prices predicted by a hedonic price equation. Counterfactual 
scenarios are adjusted to account for the fact that GE crop varieties crowded out non-GE varieties by the 
end of our sample. We estimate that GE innovations increased farmers’ welfare by more than $14 billion 
over the period of study. We also find that the development and diffusion of GE traits increased U.S. corn 
and soybean seed industry revenues by nearly $23 billion over this period. Thus, seed firms have been 
able to appropriate the larger share of the ex post value of innovation created by GE technologies. 
Keywords 
Discrete choice, Innovation, Nested logit, Product characteristics, Seed demand, Transgenic crops, 
Welfare 
Disciplines 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 




 Valuing Product Innovation:  
Genetically Engineered Varieties  
in U.S. Corn and Soybeans  
 
 
 Federico Ciliberto, GianCarlo Moschini, and Edward D. Perry  
 




Center for Agricultural and Rural Development 
Iowa State University 













Federico Ciliberto: Department of Economics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904 
(email: fc3p@virginia.edu); GeanCarlo Moschini: Department of Economics and Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011-1070 (email: 
moschini@iastate.edu); Edward D. Perry:Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State 
University, Manhattan, KS 66506-4011 (email: edperry@ksu.edu). 
 
This research was supported by the National Institute of Food and Agriculture, U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, grant No. 2015-67023-22954. Ciliberto also thanks the Bankard Fund for Political 
Economy at the University of Virginia for financial support, and Moschini gratefully acknowledges 
the support of the Pioneer Endowed Chair in Science and Technology Policy at Iowa State 
University.  
 
This publication is available online on the CARD website: www.card.iastate.edu. Permission is 
granted to reproduce this information with appropriate attribution to the author and the Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011-1070. 
 
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, ethnicity, religion, national 
origin, pregnancy, sexual orientation, gender identity, genetic information, sex, marital status, disability, or 
status as a U.S. veteran. Inquiries can be directed to the Interim Assistant Director of Equal Opportunity and 
Compliance, 3280 Beardshear Hall, (515) 294-7612. 
 
 
Valuing Product Innovation: Genetically Engineered Varieties in U.S. Corn and Soybeans 
 
Federico Ciliberto, GianCarlo Moschini, and Edward D. Perry * 
 
Abstract  
We develop and estimate a discrete-choice model of differentiated products for the corn and soybean 
seed industry in the United States to assess the welfare impact of genetically engineered (GE) crop 
varieties. We use a unique dataset, spanning the period 1996-2011, that contains rich information on 
the adoption of GE traits. Using a two-level nested logit model, we estimate that U.S. farmers are 
willing to pay a significant premium for GE traits, and this value has increased over time. Over the 
last five years of the sample, our results imply that farmers’ average willingness to pay for glyphosate 
tolerance in soybeans was $24/acre/year. During the same period, farmers’ willingness to pay for a 
common triple-stack in corn that includes two insect resistance traits and glyphosate tolerance was 
$35/acre/year. To compute overall welfare estimates, we evaluate counterfactual scenarios in which 
GE varieties are not available, with counterfactual non-GE seed prices predicted by a hedonic price 
equation. Counterfactual scenarios are adjusted to account for the fact that GE crop varieties crowded 
out non-GE varieties by the end of our sample. We estimate that GE innovations increased farmers’ 
welfare by more than $14 billion over the period of study. We also find that the development and 
diffusion of GE traits increased U.S. corn and soybean seed industry revenues by nearly $23 billion 
over this period. Thus, seed firms have been able to appropriate the larger share of the ex post value 
of innovation created by GE technologies.  
 
  
Key Words: Discrete choice, Innovation, Nested logit, Product characteristics, Seed demand, 
Transgenic crops, Welfare 
 
JEL Codes: L11, L13, O13, Q12. 
 
 
* Ciliberto: Department of Economics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904 (email: 
fc3p@virginia.edu);  Moschini: Department of Economics and Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011-1070 (email: moschini@iastate.edu);  Perry:  
Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506-4011 (email: 
edperry@ksu.edu).  This research was supported by the National Institute of Food and Agriculture, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, grant No. 2015-67023-22954.  Ciliberto also thanks the Bankard 
Fund for Political Economy at the University of Virginia for financial support, and Moschini 
gratefully acknowledges the support of the Pioneer Endowed Chair in Science and Technology 




Innovation, in the form of new and improved crop varieties, has long played a critical role in the quest 
to ensure sufficient food supply for a rapidly growing world population. Conventional breeding 
activities have led to remarkable successes, such as hybrid maize (Griliches 1957) and the green 
revolution (Evenson and Gollin 2003). Genetically engineered (GE) crop varieties build on this 
tradition by exploiting the recombinant DNA tools of modern biotechnology. First introduced 
commercially in 1996, by most standards GE varieties have been very successful (Moschini, 2008). 
Despite being essentially limited to four main crops (maize, soybean, cotton, and canola), as of 2016 
GE varieties were grown on more than 457 million acres worldwide. The United States has been at 
the forefront of these developments: in 2016, GE varieties were planted on more than 180 million 
acres of U.S. farmland, nearly 95% of which was maize and soybeans (ISAAA 2016). 
Notwithstanding their productivity-enhancing potential, GE crops have been highly 
controversial. Concerns raised include the fear that GE products are harmful to human health and/or 
the environment, and ethical objections related to human manipulation of the DNA of living plants 
and animals. Many of these concerns have been allayed (Bennett et al. 2013). In particular, the 
environmental impacts of GE varieties appear to be generally positive (NRC 2010, Barrows, Sexton, 
and Zilberman 2014). However, a separate persistent source of public mistrust relates to the ownership 
interests of multinational corporations that commercialize GE products. Unlike innovations 
underpinning the green revolution, which were largely the result of publicly-sponsored research and 
development (R&D) activities (Wright 2012), GE crop varieties have been primarily developed by 
private firms, with U.S. seed companies (Monsanto in primis) at the forefront. The proprietary nature 
of GE technologies, and an ongoing consolidation of the seed and agrochemical industry, has 
heightened concerns about the pricing of these new products, their contribution to welfare, and the 
actual beneficiaries of the innovation (Clancy and Moschini 2017).  
In this paper we provide novel econometric evidence on the welfare effects of the introduction 
of GE crop varieties. We draw on a large, proprietary dataset of plot-level seed choices by a 
representative sample of U.S. farmers for the two most important GE crops, corn and soybeans. The 
data span the period from 1996 (the year GE corn and soybean varieties were first introduced) to 2011 
(by which time the average adoption rate of GE varieties exceeded 90%), and contain information on 
the specific seed products that farmers buy—brand, amount bought, area planted, price paid, and 
which (if any) GE traits are included in the seed. The richness of the data allows us to estimate an 
explicit structural model of farmers’ demand for seed varieties rooted in the theory of discrete choice 
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in a differentiated product setting (Anderson, De Palma and Thisse 1992). Although this model 
pertains to a production input (seeds) used by competitive firms, rather than consumer products, it is 
nonetheless in the tradition of the empirical industrial organization (IO) literature on demand 
estimation in industries with differentiated products (Berry 1994; Goldberg 1995; Berry, Levinsohn 
and Pakes 1995; Nevo 2001). This demand model provides the structural foundation for evaluating 
the welfare impacts of the introduction of new characteristics—GE traits—into seed products, along 
the lines of the seminal contributions of Trajtenberg (1989) and Petrin (2002).  
We estimate the welfare gain attributable to GE traits, and its distribution between farmers 
and seed manufacturers, by simulating counterfactual scenarios of the U.S. corn and soybean seed 
markets without GE traits as an available technology. Construction of these counterfactual scenarios 
proceeds in three steps. First, we specify and estimate a discrete choice model of seed demand that 
presumes individual profit maximizing choices, with farmers modeled as choosing between all corn 
and soybean varieties (in addition to the outside option). Specifically, we model the demand for corn 
and soybean seed products using a two-level nested logit specification (Verboven 1996; Bjornerstedt 
and Verboven 2016). The upper level consists of the outside option (planting a crop other than corn 
or soybeans, or not planting at all) and the set of inside options, the latter encompassing all corn and 
soybean seed products. The inside options are partitioned into two subgroups, one for soybean seed 
products and the other for corn seed products. This two-level nested specification is particularly suited 
to the institutional realities of the problem we study, including the role played by the widespread 
practice of crop rotation.  
The estimates from the demand model allow us to infer the willingness-to-pay (WTP) of 
farmers for seed products over time, and, more specifically, for the GE traits progressively embedded 
into seed varieties. Estimated WTP for GE traits do not convey the net benefit to farmers of the new 
technology, however. For that purpose, we need to account for the price premia commanded by 
varieties embedding GE trait combinations, as well as the likely competitive price effect on non-GE 
varieties. Hence, our second step is to determine the seed prices that would have been charged had 
GE seeds not been introduced (the “counterfactual prices”). We follow Hausman and Leonard (2002) 
and take a reduced-form approach that is agnostic as to the actual mode of competition in the seed 
industry. In so doing we circumvent the problematic issue of how to model a supply side that is 
characterized by a complex web of GE trait cross-licensing agreements (the terms of which are 
confidential) between seed firms. In practice, we estimate a hedonic regression that includes a post-
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GE indicator variable that is equal to one for any observation in a market for which a GE variety is 
available (otherwise, this variable is equal to zero).  
The final step consists of computing farmers’ counterfactual expected profits by using the 
structure of the estimated seed demand model together with counterfactual prices. We do so for three 
alternative counterfactual choice sets. One option is simply to remove all seed products with GE traits 
from farmers’ choice sets. This is labeled as the “Naïve” scenario because it ignores the fact that, as 
GE seeds became widely adopted over time, the set of available non-GE seeds was increasingly 
reduced. The crowding out of existing products by new products is an issue that has received relatively 
little explicit attention (an exception is Eizenberg 2014). In our context, the Naïve scenario entails 
reduced farmers’ choice sets, particularly in the latter part of our sample. Insofar as this feature of the 
counterfactual is artificial, it will bias upward the estimated welfare gain from GE traits. To address 
this problem, we construct two other counterfactual product choice sets by removing the GE trait 
characteristics from any GE product available in a market, while presuming that this results in a viable 
seed product. In all cases, the hedonic price function permits us to impute counterfactual prices for 
all products in the counterfactual choice sets.  
Given the demand model estimates, counterfactual prices, and the counterfactual product 
choice sets, we compute the change in expected profit for U.S. farmers due to the availability of the 
GE technology. We also use the estimated model to infer the additional revenues accruing to seed 
companies from the ability to market products embedding GE traits. This can be interpreted as the 
ex post return to R&D activities that led to the development of GE varieties. In the most conservative 
counterfactual scenario, we find that the availability of GE varieties increased farmers’ welfare by 
about $14.9 billion overall over the period of study, or by $6.49/year per acre of corn or soybeans 
grown. In the Naïve scenario (where GE products are entirely removed from the choice set), the 
welfare estimates are about three times larger at nearly $45 billion, or $19.97/acre/year. Thus, 
accounting for the fact that GE products crowded out non-GE products has a substantial impact on 
the estimated welfare gains. The development and diffusion of GE traits is estimated to have increased 
seed revenue, in the U.S. corn and soybean industry, by about $23 billion over the period of study. 
Hence, it seems that the seed industry has been able to appropriate the larger share of the ex post value 
created by the GE technology.  
Our analysis adds to the literature on the estimation of the value of product innovation 
(Trajtenberg, 1989; Hausman, 1996; Petrin, 2002; Nevo 2013; Eizenberg, 2014; Allenby et al., 2014) 
by focusing squarely on the introduction of new characteristics (the GE traits). In particular, both the 
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data and the econometric framework that we use in this paper are new for the purpose of assessing 
the welfare impacts of GE crop varieties. Earlier studies on this topic (Falck-Zepeda, Traxler, and 
Nelson, 2000; Moschini, Lapan, and Sobolevsky, 2000) lacked an econometric backbone and instead 
relied on indirect evidence to parameterize partial equilibrium models that could be used for 
counterfactual analysis. As such, they were ill suited to capture the impact of seed pricing of GE crops 
that is critical in this setting. Using a subset of the proprietary data employed in this paper, Shi, Chavas, 
and Stiegert (2010) (with extensions in Shi, Stiegert, and Chavas 2011, and Shi et al. 2012) estimate 
hedonic regressions for the period 2000-2007 and find positive premiums for most GE traits in both 
corn and soybeans, compared with traditional varieties. But, unlike the present paper, these studies do 
not model farmers’ seed demand explicitly and thus lack the necessary structure to infer welfare 
effects.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the introduction of GE 
traits in soybean and corn seeds, their adoption, and the evolution of market shares. Section 3 presents 
the data used in the econometric analysis. Section 4 develops the discrete-choice farmers’ seed demand 
model. Section 5 reports the estimation results for this model. Section 6 presents the welfare analysis: 
farmers’ WTP estimates, farmers’ estimated increase in expected profit due to GE innovations, and 
the increase in seed industry revenues due to GE traits. Section 7 concludes. 
2. BACKGROUND: GE TRAITS IN U.S. CORN AND SOYBEAN SEEDS 
The distinguishing feature of GE crops (also known as transgenic crops) is that their genome contains 
one or more foreign genes that express desirable traits. In corn and soybeans, these traits encompass 
two sets of attributes: herbicide tolerance (HT) and insect resistance (IR). The vast majority of HT 
crops are tolerant to glyphosate, a broad spectrum herbicide marketed by Monsanto under the 
trademark Roundup®. IR crops embed one or more genes from the bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis 
(hence the widely used “Bt ” moniker), which emit proteins that are toxic to certain insects. For 
soybeans, the only trait with commercial relevance thus far has been glyphosate tolerance (GT), while 
for corn, both GT and Bt traits have been commercialized. Earlier Bt traits targeted the larvae stage 
of a major pest, the European corn borer, and subsequent Bt traits targeted corn rootworms. Initially, 
GE varieties had a single trait, but over time commercial varieties have come to embed multiple GE 
traits, or what are often referred to as “stacked” GE trait varieties. Figure 1 charts the diffusion 
pattern of GE varieties in U.S. soybeans and corn, where “Bt maize” refers to varieties with at least 
one IR trait (alone or with the GT trait), and “GT maize” refers to varieties with the GT trait (alone 
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or in combination with other traits). Adoption has been rapid: GE corn and soybeans were first 
introduced in the United States in 1996 and within just 10 years accounted for the majority of planted 
acres in both crops. 
GE crops are the most visible agricultural manifestation of modern biotechnology and its use 
of recombinant DNA techniques. The company Monsanto played a critical pioneering role in this 
process,1 and its commitment to the development of GE crops has had major implications for the 
seed industry. GE traits are valuable to farmers because they offer novel (cost-reducing and/or yield 
enhancing) tools for weed and insect control. However, these properties alone are not sufficient to 
guarantee adoption. GE traits need to be combined with proven germplasm—the genetics 
accumulated from traditional breeding and selection activities that result in high-yielding and desirable 
commercial seed varieties. Thus, GE traits and germplasm are truly complementary assets (Graff, 
Rausser and Small 2003), both of which have become extremely valuable to seed manufacturers due 
to the increasing importance of intellectual property rights (Moschini 2010). Well before the advent 
of genetic engineering, the corn seed industry had already thrived through its use of hybridization 
(which requires farmers to buy first generation seeds for each planting) and trade secrets, which 
together effectively prevent imitation. By contrast, commercial soybeans are self-pollinating and thus 
reproduce “true to type,” allowing farmers to replant seed from the previous season’s harvest without 
any loss in expected yield. The introduction of patented GE traits, and the ability of seed companies 
to write (and enforce) restrictive retailing contracts forbidding farmers to save and replant seeds that 
contain such traits, thus significantly increased the profitability of selling soybean seeds. 
The quest to commercialize GE traits led to a wave of acquisitions and mergers that promoted 
a rapid consolidation in the seed industry.2 When Monsanto originally developed and patented its GE 
traits it did not have a presence in the seed industry, and thus lacked direct access to commercial seed 
varieties. As a result, Monsanto pursued two parallel strategies for the commercialization of its GE 
traits. First, it embarked on a series of acquisitions that, over time, transformed it into the largest seed 
company in the world. At the same time, Monsanto pursued a policy of aggressively licensing GE 
traits to other seed companies, which also sped up the availability of GE traits to farmers.  
                                                 
1 Charles (2002) provides a fascinating account of the road to the commercial development and 
marketing of the first GE varieties. 
 
2 For more information on this process, see Fernandez-Cornejo (2004) and UNCTAD (2006).  
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Monsanto’s critical acquisitions included Asgrow (in 1997), Dekalb (in 1998) and Holden 
Foundation Seeds (in 1997). The early emphasis on broad “life science” companies also led to 
Monsanto becoming the agricultural subsidiary of Pharmacia Corporation in 2000, only to be spun 
out as an independent company in 2002. Similar considerations led DuPont to acquire Pioneer, the 
dominant seed company at the time in 1999. Syngenta was formed in 2000 as an agrochemical and 
seed business from the consolidation and restructuring of major life science companies (Novartis and 
AstraZeneca). Dow AgroSciences, a subsidiary of Dow Chemical formed in 1997, acquired Mycogen 
in 1998. By the year 2000, when AgReliant (a joint venture of KWS and Limagrain) was also formed, 
the fundamental structure of the corn and soybean seed industry had been established, although a 
number of other, smaller acquisitions would be made in subsequent years (especially by Monsanto). 
Market shares, reported as 4-year averages for the 2000-2015 period, are displayed in Table 1. 
Data for 2000-2011 are from GfK Kynetec, the source of the proprietary data used in the econometric 
analysis. Because these data are available to us only up to 2011, for the most recent years the market 
shares reported in Table 1 are from the Farm Journal, a trade magazine.3 These market share data 
show an industry with two dominant firms (Monsanto and DuPont) who control approximately 60% 
of the soybean seed market and 70% of the corn seed market.  Three other firms (Syngenta, Dow 
AgroSciences, and AgReliant) have considerably smaller but significant presence, with the industry 
completed by a panoply of local and regional companies. Table 1 also shows the almost complete 
disappearance of the once-common practice of seed saving in soybeans (which accounted for more 
than 25% of soybean planting prior to the advent of GE varieties). 
3. DATA 
The data used in this study consists of a large set of farm-level observations of seed choices by U.S. 
corn and soybean farmers for the period 1996-2011. In particular, we use the soybean and corn 
TraitTrak® datasets, two proprietary datasets developed by GfK Kynetec, a unit of a major market 
research organization that specializes in the collection of agriculture-related survey data. GfK Kynetec 
constructs the TraitTrak® data from annual surveys of randomly sampled farmers in the United States. 
The samples are developed to be representative at the crop reporting district (CRD) level, and, from 
                                                 
3  The market share data reported by Farm Journal are based on polling industry analysts and 
executives, and have been published since 2009. In the three years (2009-2011) that the Farm Journal 
and GfK Kynetec data overlap, the firm level shares are very similar. 
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1996-2011, contain an annual average of 4,716 farmers for maize and 3,573 farmers for soybeans.4 
Importantly, the period we observe covers the early stages of GE trait adoption up to its almost 
complete diffusion by 2011.  
In the survey, farmers are asked about the types (brand and hybrid/variety identity), amounts, 
and cost of seed they purchase. The seed varieties sold to farmers are highly differentiated, with each 
variety reflecting the accumulation of many generations of traditional breeding aimed at producing 
characteristics that match particular agro-climatic conditions. Examples of these characteristics include 
relative maturity, stalk strength, plant height, dry-down, and resistance to local pests. 
For the purpose of this study, we define a seed “product” as a unique combination of four 
types of characteristics: i) the crop (corn or soybeans); ii) the parent company (e.g., Monsanto); iii) the 
brand (e.g., Asgrow); and, iv) the presence (or absence) of GE traits, specifically glyphosate tolerance 
(GT), corn borer (CB) resistance, and rootworm (RW) resistance.5 
3.1. Traits  
Each of the various GE traits were introduced at different times in our sample. In soybeans, the GT 
trait was introduced by Monsanto in 1996 as Roundup Ready® soybeans, and in corn the GT trait 
was first commercialized in 1998. The main attraction of the GT trait is that, by allowing post-
emergence applications of glyphosate without causing injury to the crop, it greatly facilitates and 
reduces the cost of weed control.6 The first Bt trait in maize was introduced in 1996 and conferred 
                                                 
4 CRDs are multi-county sub-state regions identified by the National Agricultural Statistics Service of 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
 
5 In principle, we could define a product at the individual hybrid/variety level. The number of available 
varieties in any given year, however, is too large to be of practical use. For example, 5,065 distinct corn 
varieties and 2,141 distinct soybean varieties were purchased in 2007. By contrast, for that year, our 
definition results in 394 distinct products, which we submit is small enough to be econometrically 
tractable, and large enough to still capture the fundamental elements of product differentiation in the 
seed industry. 
 
6 The GT trait is not the only herbicide tolerant trait in corn and soybeans. There is also a GE trait 
that provides tolerance to the herbicide glufosinate. This trait was developed by Bayer and marketed 
under the tradename LibertyLink (LL). It has been available in some corn varieties since 1996 and in 
some soybean varieties since 2009. In our econometric analysis, we ignore this trait for two reasons. 
First, it has been rarely adopted, especially in soybeans, where it only became available in very limited 
quantities late in our sample. In corn, this trait can be found in more commercialized varieties, but 
this is mostly because it primarily served as a marker gene for the Bt traits (a marker gene is used to 
determine whether the insertion process was successful). Thus, most growers did not intend to use 
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resistance to the European corn borer (CB). Later Bt traits, which provided resistance to various 
species of corn rootworms (RW), were introduced in 2003. The attractiveness of Bt varieties is that 
they increase expected yields and reduce yield volatility (Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2014; Xu et al. 
2013), while also reducing the need for insecticides to control pests. Unlike GT traits, which are highly 
complementary to a specific chemical, Bt traits substitute for chemical inputs (Perry et al., 2016). 
Figure 1 shows that the adoption of GE varieties, however fast by most standards, was 
gradual. These rates were dictated by both demand and supply-side factors. On the demand side, 
learning and heterogeneity played a role, especially early on. On the supply side, both the regulatory 
apparatus and technological constraints have been important. 
The advent of GE crops in agriculture has spurred active new regulatory measures.7 The 
biosafety regulatory framework for GE products in the United States envisions distinct roles for the 
USDA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
and prescribes a fairly lengthy and onerous process for approval. A key element is that the unit of 
regulation is a single “transformation event” (McHughen and Smyth 2008), which is the unique 
occurrence of a successful integration of a transgene (which expresses a GE trait) into a plant’s 
genome. Once an event has successfully passed regulatory hurdles (i.e., it is “deregulated,” in the jargon 
of the U.S. regulatory framework), the transgene needs to be embedded into elite commercial seed 
varieties. The main breeding strategy to achieve this objective is backcrossing, a process that requires 
several years (Bradford et al. 2005). We note at this juncture that the fact that it takes so long to 
commercialize a trait plays an important role in the identification strategy we employ in the 
econometric analysis.  
Table 2 reports detailed GE trait adoption rates. Each column provides the annual adoption 
rate for a specific GE trait combination (thus, in corn, the sum across columns is the total annual GE 
adoption rate). Among all GE-crop combinations, the most rapidly adopted were GT soybeans, which 
                                                 
the LibertyLink trait when they purchased varieties that (incidentally) contained it. Indeed, based on 
pesticide data used in Perry et al. (2016), we found that only a small fraction of corn producers who 
purchased seed containing the LL trait actually used any glufosinate herbicide. There are also 
traditionally-bred varieties that are tolerant to the imidazoline herbicide (for corn) and to sulfonylurea 
herbicides (for soybeans). As with the LL trait, such varieties have had low adoption rates. Because 
our focus is on the difference in value between GE and non-GE crops, in our primary econometric 
analysis we ignore these other herbicide tolerance traits.  
 
7 In some jurisdictions, such as the European Union, GE crops are not allowed for planting (although 
harvested oilseed products and grains from GE crops are allowed for import). 
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even surpassed the rate at which corn hybrids were adopted (Griliches 1957). By 2003, over 90% of 
land was planted to GT soybeans, and by 2011 it was 96%. The adoption of GT maize was slower but 
still achieved a 90% rate by 2011. The adoption of IR traits has been steady as well, with the CB traits 
(alone or in combination) attaining a 72% adoption rate and RW traits (alone or in combination) 
achieving a 55% adoption rate by 2011. This table also illustrates the gradual penetration of stacked- 
trait varieties. By 2011, the triple stack GT-CB-RW was adopted on 54% of maize acres. Note also 
that the RW trait, owing to its relatively late introduction, has had little diffusion as a standalone trait, 
instead becoming available to farmers primarily in combination with other traits.  
Table 3 reports nominal per-acre average seed costs for each GE trait combination. These 
prices reveal three important stylized facts about the seed markets. The first is that all prices have 
trended up over time. Both GE and non-GE prices more than doubled from 1996 to 2011. The 
second is that GE varieties command a substantial premium over non-GE varieties. In soybeans, the 
premium was around $9/acre, and in corn the premium ranged from about $9/acre for standalone 
trait varieties to nearly $30/acre for varieties with all three GE traits. The third stylized fact is that 
over time GE prices increased by more than non-GE prices. In soybeans, the increase in this price 
difference was small, as the average premium in 2011 was about $9, only about $1 greater than the 
average premium in 1997. In corn, the price difference between GE and traditional varieties widened 
significantly over time. The average premium for corn with the GT trait, e.g., was just $4-$5 per acre 
prior to 2005, but then increased significantly to about $16/acre by 2011. Similar increases occurred 
for the other corn GE combinations. 
3.2. Brands 
The marketing of seeds relies heavily on brand labels. Well-known and long-standing brands such as 
Dekalb and Pioneer identify germplasm that was developed over a long period of time, and thus carry 
an established reputation among growers. Shares and prices for each of the major brands in our sample 
are reported in Table 4. 
Most brands have a presence in both corn and soybeans, albeit at a different intensity. For 
example, Monsanto has primarily marketed corn under the Dekalb brand and soybeans under the 
Asgrow brand. By contrast, DuPont uses the Pioneer brand heavily in both corn and soybeans. There 
is also variation in the number of brands held by the different parent companies. Monsanto and 
Syngenta utilize multiple brands, whereas DuPont almost exclusively uses Pioneer. Brand-specific 
average prices demonstrate significant variation, reflecting a number of effects, including the average 
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value of the underlying germplasm, and the extent of inclusion of GE traits. The latter explains the 
particularly low average price of publicly available soybean seeds, which do not include any GE traits.  
3.3. Product Lines  
An essential step in our empirical discrete choice framework is the definition of a “product.” Our goal 
is to capture, in a tractable way, the essential seed characteristics that matter to buyers: the nature of 
the germplasm, which is captured by the seed brand, and the presence of GE traits. Hence, as noted 
earlier, we define a seed product as a unique combination of the crop (e.g., corn), the parent company 
(e.g., Monsanto), brand (e.g., Dekalb), and the GT, CB, and RW traits. To illustrate further, all varieties 
sold under the Dekalb brand in the same market, and with the same set of GE traits (say, GT and 
CB), are treated as one product.  
 One of the important features to note about our product definition is that the number and 
type of varieties that are aggregated within each product change over space and time. For example, 
from 2003 to 2011, the number of Pioneer corn varieties purchased with the GT trait rose from 9 to 
75.  It is thus more appropriate to think of a “product” as a “product line”, one which is subject to 
change over time. One implication of this is that, within our econometric framework, the value of a 
GE product line should be permitted to change over time. As more and more hybrids are offered with 
a particular GE trait combination, a wider range of grower needs can be matched, raising the average 
value of that trait combination. Thus, in estimating our econometric model we permit the return to 
GE varieties to differ over three sub-periods. By doing so, we not only permit the return to GE traits 
to vary in accordance with the range of seeds that incorporate them, but also in accordance with other 
exogenous changes in the industry (e.g., glyphosate going off patent in 2000).     
3.4. Market Definition 
Another important component in our empirical framework is the definition of a market, which 
determines the set of available products to residing farmers. We define a market as a CRD-year 
combination. As previously noted, CRDs are multi-county, sub-state regions identified by the National 
Agricultural Statistical Service. We define market at this level for three reasons. First, a CRD is the 
lowest level at which the GFK Kynetec survey data are designed to be representative. Second, agro-
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climatic conditions are relatively homogeneous within a given CRD. 8  Finally, this is the spatial 
definition of markets that seed firms themselves use to analyze competitive issues.9 Overall, this 
definitions results in 3,874 markets (CRD-year combinations) encompassing 294 distinct CRDs.10  
A delicate issue, in this context, concerns the definition of the potential market size. Ideally, 
in a given market, this is given by the amount of land that could realistically be planted to corn or 
soybeans. To identify this area, we use cropland measures from the Census of Agriculture (USDA-
NASS 2014). This is the main source of data concerning land use in the United States, and it is available 
at 5-year intervals (Bigelow and Borchers 2017). The cropland measure we use includes “cropland 
used for crops” (itself encompassing three components: cropland harvested, crop failure, and 
cultivated summer fallow) and “idle cropland.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, we observe very little variation 
in cropland acres over time. Hence, within each CRD, we assume that the size of potential total seed 
demand is constant over our sample period, and specifically define it as the maximum of reported 
cropland across the four censuses that pertain to years encompassed by our sample period (1997, 
2002, 2007, and 2012).  
Table 5 provides information on the average number of products in each market. For both 
corn and soybeans, the number of products increased steadily up until 2007 and then declined 
thereafter. This patterns reflects the fact that, as the adoption of GE traits increased (recall Figure 1), 
more and more varieties became available to farmers both with and without GE traits. Later in the 
sample, as farmers’ demand for transgenic varieties exceeded that for traditionally bred varieties, some 
of the latter were discontinued. This pattern is more marked in corn because there are three GE traits 
(GT, CB, and RW), compared to one in soy (GT). The fact that the number of products changed so 
significantly over time is a distinctive attribute of the industry. As we discuss in more detail below, this 
has certain challenging implications for estimating the welfare associated with the introduction of GE 
crops. 
                                                 
8 Most corn and soybean varieties are bred to possess characteristics that match a particular agro-
climatic region. For example, the more northern U.S. regions have shorter growing seasons, so seeds 
bred for those regions have shorter maturity periods.  
 
9 See, for example, Monsanto (2009). 
 
10 There are 303 CRDs in the contiguous 48 states, but some are never present in the data because of 
negligible corn and soybean production. Also, some CRDs that are present are not sampled every year 
by GfK Kynetec. This happened when the expected number of acres grown were too low to warrant 
the collection of data. On average, our data encompasses 242 CRDs per year.  
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4. FARMERS’ SEED DEMAND 
Each unit of observation in the data is a farmer’s choice of a seed product, denoted by j, to be planted 
on plot i  of size iL . We model this decision as a discrete choice with a profit maximization objective. 
The profit from planting plot i with seed product j  can be expressed as ij i i j iRY W Z P SΠ = − ⋅ − , 
where R  is the output price, iY  is total output produced, iS  is the quantity of seed, iZ  is the vector 
of all inputs apart from seed and land (e.g., fertilizers, labor, energy, …), W  is the corresponding 
vector of input prices, and jP  is the price of seed product j. Note that we are omitting the rental price 
of land in this representation, so profit represents the return to the quasi-fixed input land.  
The production function is written as ( ), ,i j i i iY F L S Z= . Note that this function, in principle, 
is specific to the identity of seed product j  (this captures the fact that, compared with traditional seed 
products, GE varieties may use different amounts and types of pesticides and/or a different quantity 
of labor). We assume that this production function satisfies two basic properties: constant returns to 
scale (i.e., doubling all inputs doubles total output); and, a fixed proportion of land and seed. That is, 
we can write the production function as  
(1) ( ) ( ) { }, , min ,j i i i j i i i i jF L S Z f Z L L S λ= ×  
where the parameter jλ  denotes seed density (amount of seed per unit of land). By construction 
( )j i if Z L  is strictly concave in the vector of input intensities i iZ L . For a given plot of size iL , and 
given that at an optimal solution i j iS Lλ= , upon an optimal choice of input intensities i iZ L , the 
per-acre maximized profit can be represented as ( , )ij i j j jL R W Pπ λΠ = − , where the per-acre profit 
function ( , )j R Wπ  is dual to the per-acre production function ( )j i if Z L .  
Because of the linear homogeneity property of ( , )j R Wπ , the per-acre profit function is 
homogeneous of degree one in the vector of all prices ( , , )jR W P . In the econometric application that 
follows, we pool seed choices across multiple years, during which prices changed dramatically. To 
account for this, we exploit the homogeneity property and deflate all prices by an appropriate input 
price index IW  and write per-acre profit in real terms, ( )ij ij i IL Wπ ≡ Π , to obtain  
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(2) ( , )ij j jr w pπ π= −  
where ijπ  is the profit per acre on plot i  when using seed product j , ( , )r w  is the vector of deflated 
prices of output and all other inputs, and j j j Ip P Wλ≡  is the deflated price per acre of seed product 
j .11   
4.1. The econometric model 
Farmers’ choices are observed in the context of given markets, where a market is defined as a CRD-
year combination. Building on equation (2), we model farmers as selecting the seed product that 
provides the highest expected profit per acre on plot i in market m, that is, they choose product j such 
that 
(3) max ijmj
π  ,   { }0,1,..., mj J∈  
where mJ  denotes the number of seed products available in market m , and 0j =  denotes the outside 
option.  
We specify per-acre profits in (2) as being composed of an observable and unobservable part. 
The observable part is assumed to be linear in parameters, and to depend on product characteristics, 
as well as a number of fixed and random effects.  Specifically, the per-acre profit of choosing seed 
product j  on plot i   in market m  is written as:  
(4) [ ], [ ] [ ], [ ] [ ], [ ]ijm m j jm c j t m c j l m c j b j jm ijm
jm ijm
px ξ ξ ξ ξ ν
δ ν




where the vector jx  comprises indicator variables that code for the presence of one or more GE traits 
in seed product j  (these variables take value zero for conventional seed products), and jmp  is the 
associated price. For the outside option, we follow standard convention and set 0 0i m i mπ ν= . Similar 
to most empirical discrete choice models, the price jmp  enters linearly in equation (4). However, in 
                                                 
11 Specifically, for IW  we use the crop sector index for prices paid, published by the USDA. This 




contrast to consumer demand models, where linearity is typically a functional form simplification, in 
our context it follows directly from the structural assumption of fixed proportions between land and 
seed, a property of the production technology that applies to this setting. 
The terms [ ], [ ]c j t mξ , [ ], [ ]c j l mξ  and [ ], [ ]c j b jξ  are, respectively, crop-time, crop-region, and crop-
brand fixed effects. The subscript notation follows Gelman and Hill (2007): [ ]c j  indicates the crop 
output associated with seed product j (either soybeans or corn), [ ]b j  indicates the brand of seed 
product j (for example, Dekalb), [ ]t m  denotes the year corresponding to market m, and [ ]l m  denotes 
the CRD (l stands for location) corresponding to market m. This large set of fixed effects controls for 
unobservable heterogeneity in yields, output, and input prices across time, regions, brands, and crops. 
The term jmξ  captures the unobserved product-market specific components that motivate our 
identification discussion below.  Following standard notation, the foregoing terms can collectively be 
denoted jmδ , which captures the mean profit that is common across all plots within market m .  
Finally, ijmν  is the unobserved plot-specific component. An important element of corn and 
soybean farming captured by this term is the effect of crop rotation. The practice of alternating 
between corn and soybeans on a given plot is very widespread in U.S. agriculture, as it has been shown 
to increase profit by increasing yields, reducing fertilizer needs and improving weed control (Bullock 
1992). Hence, a given plot planted to corn (soybeans) in year 1t −  is much more likely to be planted 
to soybean (corn) in year t . Unfortunately, we cannot observe past crop choices for individual plots. 
However, knowledge of the critical importance of crop rotation motivates the choice of the nested 
logit model discussed below.    
To make the choice model in (3)-(4) operational, we need distributional assumptions on the 
plot-specific unobservable ijmν . We maintain that the demand for corn and soybean seed products is 
best modeled using a two-level nested logit specification (Verboven 1996; Bjornerstedt and Verboven 
2016). We specify the upper level as consisting of the outside option and the set of inside options, 
where the latter consists of all corn and soybean seed products. We then further partition the inside 
options into two subgroups, one for soybean seed products and the other for corn seed products.  
This is illustrated in Figure 2.  Partitioning the choice problem in this way is consistent with the 
observation that most of U.S. corn and soybeans are produced in the Midwestern states where they 
are by far the dominant crops. That is, switching to the outside option, from planting either corn or 
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soybeans, is uncommon. 12  Furthermore, as noted earlier, the practice of crop rotation plays an 
important role in farmers’ choices (Hennessy 2006, Hendricks, Smith and Sumner 2014). The 
presumption is that, for example, if the expected return to a corn seed product on a given plot is 
unattractive, a grower will typically be much more likely to consider another corn seed product as an 
alternative, rather than switch to a soybean seed product instead. As shown by Grigolon and Verboven 
(2014), when such market segments are an important differentiating dimension, the nested logit model 
can perform as well as computationally more complex random coefficient models.   
To implement this nesting structure, let the choice set in market m be partitioned into two 
mutually exclusive groups denoted by { }0,1g∈ , where 0g =  represents the outside option and 
1g =  represents inside goods. The latter group is further partitioned into two subgroups denoted by 
{ }1,2h∈ , where 1h =  represents corn seed products and 2h =  represents soybean seed products. 
We specify the plot-specific unobserved component as follows: 
(5) ( ) ( )2 11 1ijm igm ihm ijmν ε σ ε σ ε= + − + − , 
where, following standard practice, the terms igmε , ihmε , and ijmε  are assumed to possess the unique 
distribution such that the terms of interest have an extreme value distribution (Berry 1994, Verboven 
1996). 
The terms 1σ  and 2σ  are the nesting parameters that correspond to the group and subgroup 
levels, respectively, and measure the correlation between the unobservable components of different 
products within the same subgroup 1( )σ  and within the same group 2( )σ . If 1σ  is positive and 2σ  
is equal to zero, then farmer preferences are only correlated across seed products in the same subgroup 
(soybeans or corn), and soybean and corn seed products are not substitutes in the eyes of the farmer. 
If 2σ  is also positive, then the correlation is also across seeds of different crops. If 2σ  is equal to 1, 
then farmers do not substitute inside goods with the outside good.  In order to be consistent with 
random-utility maximization, it is necessary that 2 10 1σ σ≤ ≤ ≤ , which is a testable implication of the 
model. 
                                                 
12 Hendricks, Smith and Sumner’s (2014) econometric analysis of supply response in Iowa, Illinois 
and Indiana show that the extensive margin response (transitions between corn or soybeans to other 
crops) is extremely small. 
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In any given market, let the set of seed products in subgroup h  of group g  be denoted hgmJ . 
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where hgmI , gmI  and mI  are “inclusive values” defined as follows (Björnerstedt and  Verboven 2016): 
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= − −∑  
(9) ( )ln 1 exp( )m gmI I= +  . 
Again, in our setting, 1g =  denotes the group of all inside goods, and this group comprises 
two subgroups ( 1,2h = ). Based on this specification, and with some manipulation, we obtain the 
estimating equation for the two-level nested logit:  





h m jmj JS s∈≡ ∑  is the aggregate share of all products in subgroup {1,2}h∈ , and 
1 11 21m m mS S S= +  is the total share of all inside goods. Hence, 1jm h ms S  is the (conditional) share of 
seed product  j  within subgroup h (i.e., corn or soybean), and 1 1h m mS S  is the (conditional) share of 
subgroup h in group 1g =  (the group of all inside goods). Finally, 0 11m ms S= −  is the share of the 
outside option. 
As we discuss further below, these shares are endogenous and therefore require instruments. In 
addition, the parameter that we estimate on the price variable, 1α µ≡ , is the reciprocal of the scale 
parameter µ  associated with the IID extreme value error term. This parameter can be interpreted as 




The key identification issue is the endogeneity of seed prices, which seed manufacturers set taking into 
account the fact that they are competing in an oligopoly, and factoring in differentiation across 
products. The solution to this problem, which was first proposed by Bresnahan (1987), and later 
adopted, among others, by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), consists of assuming 
that the location of firms’ varieties in the product space is exogenous, and this source of exogenous 
variation across time and geographical markets can be exploited to identify the parameters of the 
econometric model.  
 This assumption seems particularly reasonable in the seed industry because individual firms 
have shown a clear willingness to introduce traits into their seed lines as soon as they become available. 
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the introduction of traits into germplasm takes several years and thus it 
is clearly a decision that is predetermined relative to firms’ pricing decisions. Seed companies also 
invest in traditional breeding activities to improve germplasm, but again they have an incentive to 
commercialize their best products at any given point in time. The turnover of commercialized varieties 
is fairly high, with varieties exiting a market sometimes after only two or three years. Overall, this 
suggests that the introduction of new products is predetermined, and is largely exogenous to pricing 
decisions.  
 Following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) we use functions of the traits in competing 
varieties as our instruments. Since GE traits are the main characteristics that vary over seed varieties, 
this amounts to counting up the unique number of GE seed products. Specifically, we calculate four 
sets of sums. They are the total number of competing products with a particular trait configuration 
by: (i) market, (ii) company, (iii) crop, and (iv) company and crop. With seven possible crop-trait 
configurations, there are twenty-eight total instrumental variables. 
5. RESULTS 
Table 6 presents the estimation results for four different specifications of the seed demand model, 
which differ by the number of fixed effects that control for unobserved heterogeneity and by the type 
of logit model (simple logit vs nested logit). Specifically, columns 1 and 2 contain results for the two-
level nested specification discussed in Section 4.2, and columns 3 and 4 contain results for the simple 
logit specification, which is equivalent to the special case 1 2 0σ σ= = . Our primary goal with this 
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table is to establish how these modeling differences, and the use of instrumental variables, affect the 
estimated coefficients and the implied elasticities.  
In all four specifications, the coefficients are estimated precisely and the pricing and nested 
logit terms have the expected signs and ordering. The specification in column 1 is estimated with the 
richest set of fixed effects, which include year, CRD, and brand fixed effects, each of which is also 
interacted with a crop dummy variable. The year fixed effects control for temporal industry-wide 
changes, such as changes in output (corn and soybeans) prices, or changes in the prices of non-seed 
production inputs (e.g., fuel). The CRD fixed effects control for unobserved, time-invariant regional 
specific effects, such as the length of the growing season, soil quality, and weed pressure. The brand 
fixed effects control for unobserved perceived and real differences in the returns to each of the various 
brands. For example, in a given region, Pioneer seed may be generally regarded by growers as high-
yielding, and because of this its prices will be set higher. As it concerns fixed effects, the difference 
between column 1 and columns 2-4 is that the fixed effects in the latter are not interacted with a crop 
dummy variable.  
Column 1 of Table 6 contains the most general specification of this table. The  price 
coefficient is statistically significant and negative, as expected, and the nesting parameters are tightly 
estimated, with an ordering that is consistent with profit maximization ( 2 1ˆ ˆ0 1σ σ< < < ). Their 
magnitude indicates strong correlation within nests, suggesting that once producers decide on which 
crop to plant on a given plot they are very unlikely to switch, both to another crop (corn or soybeans), 
and even more so to something besides corn or soybeans. This finding supports the rationalization of 
the two-level nested logit specification provided earlier. The remaining estimates presented in column 
1 are for the coefficients associated with the GE trait dummy variables. In all cases the estimates are 
positive indicating that farmers are willing to pay a positive amount for each trait. These coefficients 
provide the basis for estimating farmers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the innovation of GE traits, 
which we consider extensively in section 6.  
Column 2 in Table 6 includes fewer controls by postulating year, CRD, and brand fixed effects 
that are not crop-specific. Relative to column 1, the results remain mostly unchanged, however, the 
subgroup nesting parameter, 2σ , increases in size and the price coefficient is significantly smaller. This 
likely reflects the fact that including crop-specific effects controls for crop-specific unobservable 
differences in products that are correlated with prices.  In moving from column 2 to column 3 we 
move from the two-level nested logit model to the basic logit model. This reduces flexibility in the 
substitution pattern between seed products (and also means that the coefficients of the price variable 
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are not directly comparable). Finally, column 4 presents results for the simple logit model without 
instrumental variables for prices. The price coefficient without instruments is substantially smaller (in 
absolute value) than in column 3. The fact that the price coefficient increases so significantly when 
going from column 4 to column 3 indicates that prices are indeed endogenous, a finding that is typical 
of differentiated product markets (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995; Trajtenberg, 1989).  
5.1 Elasticities 
To better convey the implications of the different coefficients, Table 6 also presents mean own and 
cross-price elasticities. In the two-level nested logit model of Figure 2, for all , own-price 
elasticities are given by (for notational clarity we omit market subscripts):  
(11) 2
1 1 2 1 2 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
j j j j
j j
j j h
ds p s s
s p
dp s S S
σ
α
σ σ σ σ
  = − − − − −   − − − −  
 
where 1j hs S  is the conditional share of seed product j in subgroup h  of the group of inside goods (
1g = ), and 1js S  is the conditional share of seed product j in the entire group of inside goods. Given 
this, the coefficients of the model in column 1 imply a mean own-price elasticity equal to -7.04, which 
is quite elastic. The estimated own-price elasticities get progressively smaller (in absolute value) in 
columns 2-4, as we include fewer controls and less flexibility in the substitution patterns. For the basic 
logit model in column 4, the implied mean own-price elasticity is just -0.25, an inelastic response which 
is inconsistent with models of profit-maximizing seed firms that sell differentiated products. 
The cross-price elasticities, both within seed products of the same crop, and between seed 
products of different crops, are given by: 
(12) ,  if  and  are in the same subgroup2
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For the most general model of column 1 in Table 6, the mean cross-price elasticities are thus 
0.48 within a crop (e.g., from a soybean seed product to another soybean seed product) and 0.05 
across crops (e.g., from a soybean seed product to a corn seed product). The difference between these 
mean elasticities underscores the importance of rotation considerations in farmers’ seed choices: 




any given seed product. For the outside good, the cross-price elasticity is simply j js pα .  The estimated 
cross-price elasticity for the outside good is very small at just 0.02, or about one-fortieth the magnitude 
of the mean cross-price elasticity for products of the same crop.  This indicates that the aggregate 
demand for corn and soybean seed products is rather inelastic.  
5.2 Subadditivity and Time-Varying GE Trait Effects 
Table 7 provides results for two additional specifications that expand on the specification in column 
1 in Table 6. The first column allows for complementarities (or rivalries) among GE traits as inputs. 
More specifically, there is an additional indicator variable, Multiple Traits, that takes a value of one 
whenever there is more than one GE trait in a seed product.13 The negative and significant coefficient 
in Table 7 for Multiple Traits indicates sub-additivity in the value of products with multiple GE traits. 
That is, on average farmers are willing to pay a bit less for each of multiple GE traits compared to 
what they would pay for those traits in isolation. This result is related to, but distinct from that of Shi 
et al. (2010), who find sub-additivity in the pricing of stacked GE trait varieties. Our result, being 
rooted in a structural demand model, relates specifically to the value farmers place on GE traits.  
Column 2 of Table 7 contains the estimates that we use for the welfare analysis. In contrast 
to column 1, column 2 permits the return to the various GE traits to differ across three sub-periods. 
As noted, these three sub-periods correspond to important events that likely affected the return to 
GE products. Two of these events are the expiration of Monsanto’s glyphosate patent in 2000, and 
the sharp increase in crop output prices in 2007 as part of the most recent major commodity price 
boom (Baffes and Haniotis 2010). The results in column 2 strongly indicate that the returns to GE 
varieties were indeed different and increasing over these three sub-periods. Specifically, the coefficient 
on the Soy GT Trait increased from 0.3576 in 1996-2000 to 0.5289 in 2007-2011, and the coefficient 
on the Corn GT Trait increased from 0.0385 in 1996-2000 to 0.3583 in 2007-2011. These increases 
are consistent with the fall in glyphosate prices that followed Monsanto’s patent expiration: because 
glyphosate is a complementary product to GT traits, lower prices should increase the value of these 
traits to farmers. For the CB and RW traits, there were also significant increases, particularly in the 
final sub-period. This is consistent with CB and RW products being perceived as having a yield 
                                                 
13 We also estimated regressions with stacked variables for all of the possible GE trait combinations: 
GT-CB, GT-RW, CB-GT, and GT-CB-RW. We use a generic stacked variable for its parsimony and 
because certain stacks are very seldom observed. Nonetheless, the results are largely unchanged in 
these alternative cases. 
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advantage: as output prices increase, the gap in expected revenues increases, and thus farmers’ WTP. 
The Multiple Traits coefficient also changes over time, becoming more negative in the final subperiod.  
Finally, the own and cross-price elasticities of demand are similar to previous estimates, albeit a bit 
smaller in magnitude compare to column 1 of Table 7 and to column 1 of Table 6.  
Using the estimated coefficients from column 2 in Table 7, we compute mean own and cross 
price elasticities across time (Table 8). On average, the own-price elasticities range from -4.17 in the 
first sub-period to -5.90 in the final sub-period, a 41% increase (in absolute value). In contrast, the 
mean cross-price elasticity among products of the same crop fell from 0.39 in 1996-2001 to 0.31 in 
2007-2011, while the mean cross-price elasticity among products of different crops remained small 
(0.05 in 1996-2011 and 0.04 in 2007-2011). The drop in cross-price elasticities is primarily due to a 
more congested product space because, as shown in Table 5, the total number of available products 
increased over time. As a result, for a given price increase, farmers had a larger number of alternatives 
to turn to, thus reducing the average cross-price elasticity.  
The increase in the own-price elasticities over time reflects, inter alia, the dynamics of seed 
prices. As noted by others (Nevo 2000; Bjornerstedt and Verboven 2016), the fact that price enters 
linearly in the decision-maker payoff function implies that the absolute value of price elasticities 
increase in prices. The linearity in price is a standard assumption in the discrete choice literature, 
typically invoked as a convenient parameterization. As noted earlier, however, in our production 
context price linearity can be rationalized on the basis of a reasonable condition on the production 
technology (i.e., fixed proportion between land and seeds). In any event, in our data seed prices 
increase over time, especially in the latter part of the sample. Part of the explanation is that the share 
of seed products embedding GE traits, which command a price premium, has increased considerably 
over time. A second source of rising prices was the sharp increase in crop output prices during the 
commodity price boom that characterized the last few years of our sample (Baffes and Haniotis 2010, 
Wright 2011). For the seed industry, such commodity price increases represented both a rightward-
shift in farmers’ seed demand and a cost shock, both likely contributing to increasing seed prices, 
especially in light of the noncompetitive nature of the seed industry.  
6. WELFARE ANALYSIS 
The development and commercialization of GE crops has represented a major technological 
innovation for agriculture. Unlike much prior technological change that was rooted in publicly 
sponsored agricultural research (Alston and Pardey 1996, Huffman and Evenson 1993), the 
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proprietary nature of GE traits requires appropriate non-competitive market settings to model their 
welfare impacts (Lapan and Moschini 2004). Previous studies that attempted to estimate these welfare 
effects lacked both the data and a suitable econometric framework to evaluate the pricing impacts of 
the introduction of GE seeds. Instead, these studies relied on indirect evidence to parameterize partial 
equilibrium models used for counterfactual analysis of the impacts of GE crops (Moschini, Lapan and 
Sobolevsky 2000, Falck-Zepeda, Traxler and Nelson 2000, Sobolevsky, Moschini and Lapan 2005). 
The estimated seed demand model presented in the foregoing provides the ideal framework for a 
novel empirical assessment of such welfare effects.  
 To estimate the value of GE traits on farmers and on seed firms, we proceed in three steps. 
First, we compute farmers’ WTP for GE traits, which provides an initial indication of the gross value 
of GE technologies to farmers. Second, we estimate the total welfare (i.e., total net value) of GE traits 
to farmers by simulating a counterfactual in which GE traits are not available for purchase. In order 
to conduct this simulation, however, we also need to estimate what conventional seed prices would 
have been in the absence of GE products. To this end, we use a reduced-form hedonic approach in 
the tradition of Hausman and Leonard (2002), the details of which are discussed below. In the final 
step, we estimate the additional revenue seed firms obtained from GE products.  
6.1. Farmers’ Willingness-to-Pay for GE Traits 
The WTP for a given GE trait combination is the maximum amount ($/acre) that a farmer would be 
willing to part with in order to have that particular combination added to a seed product line. To 
calculate farmers’ WTP for GE traits, we use the demand estimates from the most general model 
(column 2 of Table 7).  In a typical discrete choice random utility framework (e.g., the logit model), 
the (marginal) WTP for a particular characteristic is given by the ratio of the estimated coefficient on 
that characteristic to the estimated coefficient on the price variable (Train 2009).  Although our latent 
return function is cardinal and denominated in dollars per acre (rather than utility), the general 
procedure remains the same: the WTP for a particular GE trait is the ratio of the coefficient associated 
with that trait and the estimated price coefficient. As noted earlier, the estimated price coefficient is 
the reciprocal of the scale parameter of the extreme value distribution (i.e., 1α µ= ). Thus, in dividing 
by the price coefficient, we are simply removing the scale factor from the trait coefficients.  For 
example, the WTP for the GT trait in soybeans is: SoyGTβ α .  For a combination of GE traits, the 
relevant WTP is recovered by dividing the sum of the associated trait coefficients by the price 
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coefficient. For example, the WTP for the stacked combination GT-CB-RW in corn is 
( )CornGT CB RW Multipleβ β β β α+ + + .  
Table 9 contains WTP estimates for each of the GE-trait combinations in each of the various 
sub-periods. Because all prices in the analysis are deflated by an input price index normalized to equal 
1 in 2011, all estimates are in real terms (2011 dollars). All of the estimates appear reasonable and are 
in line with what might be expected given knowledge of seed prices and the observed adoption 
patterns by farmers. The WTP for the GT trait in soybeans was $16.68 per acre in the first sub-period, 
rose to $23.35/acre in the 2001-2006 sub-period, and then rose slightly again to $24.66/acre in the 
2007-2011 sub-period. The WTP for the Corn GT trait also increased over time but followed a 
different pattern.  From 1996-2000, the WTP for GT corn was only $1.79/acre. It then grew to 
$4.05/acre from 2001-2006, and then increased substantially to $16.71 from 2007-2011. A similar 
pattern occurred for the other corn GE traits (CB and RW). For the standalone and stacked 
combinations, the increase in value was greatest from the second to the third sub-period. The increase 
in the value of the triple-stack GT-CB-RW was particularly large, from $10.60 in second sub-period 
to $39.41 in the last sub-period.  
A common finding among all trait combinations is that their value increased over time, which 
is consistent with the temporal increase in the observed shares for GE products. One contributing 
factor has been falling glyphosate prices. Subsequent to the expiration of Monsanto’s main glyphosate 
patent in 2000, the price of glyphosate fell from $12.42/lb in 2000 to $4.74/lb in 2011 (note: a standard 
application is 0.75 lb/acre). Because glyphosate is used more heavily with GT crops, a lower price for 
this herbicide reduces the production cost of GT crops relative to non-GT crops, reinforcing farmers’ 
adoption incentive. A second factor is rising output prices in the latter years of our sample. The average 
price received by farmers for corn, as reported by the USDA, increased from $2.22/bu in the sub-
period 2001-2006 to $4.35/bu in the final sub-period 2007-2011, while for soybeans the 
corresponding price change was from $6.03/bu to $10.30/bu. Naturally, an increase in the output 
price increases the value of yield-enhancing inputs. As noted, previous work has shown that IR traits 
in corn increase yields (Nolan and Santos 2012, Xu et al. 2013), and thus higher output prices increase 
the relative value of the CB and RW traits.  A third factor is learning, which may have played a role 
earlier on. Although the limited availability and breadth of GE seeds was another factor affecting 
adoption in the first few years, anecdotally it seems that most producers also had an initial trial run 
with GE crops before wholly committing to this technology. In other words, our WTP methodology 
24 
 
is rooted in producers’ perceived value of GE traits, which likely increased as evidence of the 
efficiency-enhancing properties of GE traits accumulated.  
A final factor relates to our chosen approach to product definition. Recall that we define a 
product as a crop-brand-trait combination, which means that we aggregate over varieties within each 
combination. Over time, the types and number of these varieties changed within each defined product. 
As an example, the number of Pioneer corn hybrids offered with the GT trait (across all markets) was 
9 in 2003 and 75 in 2011. Thus, the various GE trait coefficients also capture the range of varieties 
that were offered within a particular product line. The wider the range of seeds offered within a 
product line, the more diverse the set of needs the line could match. For example, it is likely that the 
9 GT hybrids offered by Pioneer in 2003 were not as ideally matched to most farmer’s needs as the 
75 GT hybrids that the same company offered in 2011, and thus the average 2003 value of the Pioneer 
GT line across all farmers was correspondingly smaller.  
It is also worth noting that these values do not convey the actual additional profit associated 
with farmers’ use of GE traits. For that purpose, one needs to account for the additional cost to 
farmers of acquiring GE trait combinations. It would be tempting to do so by comparing the WTP 
estimates in Table 9 with the GE price premiums implicit in observed seed prices (such as those 
summarized in Table 3). However, this would not account for any competitive price effects that GE 
varieties may have exerted on non-GE products. A more compelling approach, therefore, relies on 
estimating what seed prices would have been had the innovation of GE traits not happened. 
6.2. Counterfactual Prices 
The question of what (conventional) seed prices would have been without the GE technology requires 
a counterfactual analysis because such prices are not observed. A related issue is that other products 
might have been introduced absent the opportunity to commercialize GE traits. Moreover, prices are 
not observed for any of the products that could have been developed but were not. The previous 
empirical literature has largely avoided dealing with this last issue, and has maintained that no other 
products would have been introduced in the absence of the one that would artificially be excluded. 
For example, in his seminal paper on the welfare impact of the introduction of minivans, Petrin (2002) 
did not allow for auto manufacturers to introduce new products had minivans not been developed.  
Perhaps the ideal approach to recover counterfactual prices would be to construct a full 
structural equilibrium model embedding the main drivers of price changes in the industry. With this 
approach the literature generally maintains that firms behave as Bertrand oligopolists with 
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differentiated products, and then simulates counterfactual solutions under alternative assumptions 
(Nevo 2001, Petrin 2002, Goeree 2008). Such a structural model presents challenges in our context. 
This is because, although seed firms own their own germplasm, most of them have engaged in 
extensive licensing (and cross-licensing) arrangements for GE traits. Hence, the standard Bertrand-
Nash price equilibrium conditions for differentiated products do not seem appropriate for this setting. 
Furthermore, the terms of the GE trait licensing arrangements between firms are not in the public 
domain (Moss 2010), which makes it problematic to develop a suitable structural representation of 
the supply side, and undertaking we are leaving for future research.  
To proceed, here we take a reduced-form approach that is more agnostic about the actual 
mode of competition in the seed industry. Specifically, we closely follow Hausman and Leonard 
(2002), who provide an approach to computing counterfactual prices that does not rely on a structural 
equilibrium model. We first estimate the following hedonic price equation: 
(14) [ ] [ ], [ ] [ ], [ ] [ ], [ ]jm jm c j m c j t m c j l m c j b j jmp x Dφ θ ζ ζ ζ υ= ⋅ + + + + +  
where the variable mD  is a post-GE indicator variable that is equal to one for any observation in a 
market for which a GE variety is available (otherwise, this variable is equal to zero). There are two 
coefficients for this variable, which vary by crop (soybeans or corn). The coefficients on the ‘post-
introduction’ variables capture, in a reduced-form way, the overall price effects from the introduction 
of GE innovations. The price effects are identified from the fact that GE varieties were introduced at 
different times in different regions (i.e., CRDs). Conditional on CRD-specific fixed effects, the time 
of introduction can be assumed exogenous because of the time constraints that exist for the 
development of new germplasm and the introduction of GE traits, as discussed in section 3.1.  The 
hedonic price equation in (14) also includes GE trait dummies jmx . The remaining terms in this 
equation, [ ], [ ]c j t mζ , [ ], [ ]c j l mζ  and [ ], [ ]c j b jζ  are, respectively, crop-year, crop-CRD, and crop-brand 
fixed effects, and jmυ  is an idiosyncratic shock.  
 Table 10 presents the estimation results for the hedonic price equation. The first row shows 
the effect of the introduction of the GE varieties on the prices of all soybean seed products. We find 
that the prices of soybean seeds decreased, on average, by $1.23 when GE products were present. 
The second row shows the corresponding impact on corn seed prices, which were lower by $1.15. 
These are relatively small competitive price effects, suggesting that any substantial welfare effects 
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primarily stem from an increase in the portfolio of choices that the farmers can make, or because of 
the difference between the prices charged for GE traits and farmers’ willingness to pay for them. 
The hedonic results also show that GE traits are associated with significantly higher prices, 
implying that farmers pay considerable premia for GE innovations, as anticipated by the descriptive 
statistics reported in Table 3. For example, we find that the premium for the Soy GT trait was $15.41 
in the 1996-2000 period; it declined to $13.83 in 2001-2006, and to $11.42 in 2007-2011. The corn 
GT trait, instead, saw the premium increase from $11.45 in the first subperiod to $13.22 in the final 
subperiod. The corn CB and RW traits saw the premium decline over time, but the premium was 
always greater than $9 over the sample period. Finally, the Multiple Trait stack is associated with a 
subadditivity effect, with prices being lower when GE traits are stacked (this effect amounted to $4.52 
for the last subperiod, where the triple stack GT-CB-RW was widely adopted). This subadditive effect 
is consistent with previous findings by Shi, Chavas and Stigert (2010). 
In addition to being informative of the price premiums that seed companies were able to 
charge for transgenic varieties, the estimated hedonic equation permits us to infer the prices that would 
have materialized had GE traits not been introduced in corn and soybean seed varieties. We do this 
by turning off the categorical variable that is equal to 1 if there was an innovation, and the variables 
associated with the various GE traits. More specifically, using the estimation output from Table 10, 
the predicted prices in the presence of GE traits are given by:  
(15) [ ] [ ], [ ] [ ], [ ] [ ], [ ]ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ jm jm c j m c j t m c j l m c j b jp x Dφ θ ζ ζ ζ= ⋅ + + + +  
Had transgenic varieties not been introduced, counterfactual predicted prices without GE traits are 
given by:  
(16) [ ], [ ] [ ], [ ] [ ], [ ]ˆ ˆ ˆjm c j t m c j l m c j b jp ζ ζ ζ= + + . 
In combination with the estimated farmers’ WTP for GE traits, the counterfactual prices thus 
constructed provide the basis for assessing the impact of GE product innovations on farmers. 
6.3. GE Seeds and Farmers’ Welfare 
Computation of the welfare change attributable to the introduction of GE varieties relies on the 
change in the overall inclusive values, scaled by the price parameter (i.e., the coefficient α ). 












where ˆmI  is the predicted inclusive value with GE traits and mI  is the predicted inclusive value in a 
world without GE traits (see equation (9) for the definition of  mI ) . To obtain the total dollar value 
of GE traits in market m, we multiply Ωm  by the potential market size (in acres) of market m, and to 
compute the dollar value of GE traits in the entire sample, we simply add up the dollar values across 
all markets. 
The primary inputs for equation (17) are the estimated demand parameters (α , 1σ , 2σ ) and 
mean profits jmδ . Using the predicted hedonic prices with and without GE traits, and the estimated 
terms from the seed demand equations of section 5, predicted mean profits with GE traits are given 
by: 
(18) [ ], [ ] [ ], [ ] [ ], [ ]ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆˆjm jm jm c j t m c j l m c j b j jmpxδ ξ ξ ξ ξγ − + + + += ⋅ . 
while predicted mean profits without GE traits are given by:  
(19) [ ], [ ] [ ], [ ] [ ], [ ]ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆjm jm c j t m c j l m c j b j jmpδ ξ ξ ξ ξ− + + + +=  . 
A feature to note about this procedure is that it involves the modification of characteristics 
associated with GE varieties. As previously noted, by the end of the sample GE varieties had not only 
significantly added to the set of available products, but had also replaced most conventional 
offerings.14 In 1996, for example, non-GE varieties comprised 57 out of 66 products; by 2011, they 
comprised just 38 out of 161 products. If we were to remove GE products entirely from the choice 
set in 2011 that would leave just 38 products available to growers, a number which likely 
underestimates what would have been available in the counterfactual. Maintaining such an artificial 
reduction in non-GE products in the relevant counterfactual has the potential to introduce bias in the 
estimated welfare gains from GE traits. This is especially problematic in the context of logit models. 
As noted by Petrin (2002) and Ackerberg and Rysman (2005), among others, the postulated underlying 
structure implies that an additional option mechanically increases (expected) welfare because it 
provides another draw from the distribution of random shocks.15  
                                                 
14 The crowding out of old products due to the introduction of new ones is the main concern of 
Eizenberg’s (2014) study of the impact of innovation in central processing units for US personal 
computers. 
 
15 Nevo (2011) provides an extended discussion of this point and notes that the logit model per se is 
actually not the source of biased welfare estimates. Rather, the bias arises from using the logit model 
to predict counterfactual shares. 
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We address this issue by reporting results for three different counterfactual scenarios. The first 
one is to simply remove all the GE products from the choice set of the counterfactual scenario, adjust 
the prices of the remaining conventional products (as per the hedonic price regression), and compute 
the welfare change of seed users accordingly.16 As implied by the foregoing discussion, this approach 
(labeled the “Naïve” scenario) is expected to inflate the estimated welfare effects.  
Alternatively, instead of simply removing GE products from the choice set, we modify the 
characteristics of GE products by removing the GE trait, adjusting the price, and then maintain this 
“synthetic” product in the counterfactual choice set if it does not duplicate an equivalent non-GE 
product already present (see below). The presumption is that seed manufacturers would have used the 
germplasm currently combined with GE traits to commercialize alternative conventional seed 
products instead. For example, suppose that in a given market there are three seed products: Dekalb-
GE-corn, Asgrow-conventional-soybeans, and Pioneer-conventional-corn. If we followed the Naïve 
approach, removal of GE traits would drop one product from the choice set (the remaining two would 
be Asgrow-conventional-soybeans and Pioneer-conventional-corn). Instead, with the proposed 
alternative counterfactual we retain three products: the two pre-existing conventional seed products 
plus the synthetic Dekalb-non-GE-corn. 
Implementation of this alternative procedure to construct the choice set of the counterfactual 
requires the resolution of a possible ambiguity. In some markets, after modifying the characteristics 
of GE products, we can end up with “duplicates” vis-à-vis the definition of products used in this 
study, the only difference being in the unobservable component .17 This presents the question of 
which duplicate product to keep in the counterfactual choice set. To proceed, we consider two 
versions of this alternative approach. In one case, we keep the duplicate with the largest ˆjmξ (i.e., the 
largest mean expected profit for farmers). We call this the “Keep Best” scenario. In the other case, we 
keep the duplicate that was originally a non-GE variety, a situation that we label the “Keep 
Conventional” scenario. We note at this juncture that, by reducing the counterfactual choice set the 
most, the Naïve scenario will provide the highest penalty for removing GE products, and thus will 
provide an upper bound for the estimated welfare impact on farmers. Similarly, by picking the seed 
                                                 
16 In equation (17), this amounts to an mI  in which the exponential terms for GE products have 
simply been deleted. 
 
17 For example, in a market where we have both conventional Asgrow soybeans and GT Asgrow 





product with the largest ˆjmξ , the “Keep Best” scenario provides a lower bound for the estimated 
impact of GE traits on farmers’ expected profit.  
 In addition to overall farmer gains, we also compute the change in expected maximum profit 
conditional on choosing the inside option, as well as conditional on each sub-group (e.g., corn). For 
example, we compute the welfare gain from GE traits conditional on choosing the inside good. In 
contrast to equation (17), this is given by 1 1ˆ( )m mI I α−  , where 1mI  is defined in equation (8). These 
values are of particular interest because most of the gains associated with GE crops accrue to 
individuals that actually plant corn or soybeans. Indeed, if there were no changes to the prices of 
conventional products in the counterfactual, and the set of available conventional products remained 
fixed, all farmer gains from GE traits would accrue to those who actually purchased GE products. 
Thus, the estimates reported for 1mΩ , which are in per-acre terms, will be considerably larger than the 
estimates for  Ωm  because the latter includes plots for which there were no welfare gains from GE 
crops. 
   Table 11 reports the estimated farmer welfare gains for each of the three scenarios and across 
the three sub-periods. The first set of results in Table 11 pertains to the entire period 1996-2011. We 
find that, under the “Keep Best” scenario, total farmers’ welfare gain from GE innovations is 
estimated at about $14.7 billion. This table also reports welfare gains on a per acre basis, and we find 
that on average the farmers’ welfare gain, per acre of total cropland, was $2.67 per year. Owing to the 
extremely low substitution between inside goods and the outside option, discussed earlier, a more 
interesting figure is farmers’ welfare gain per acre of inside good (corn or soybeans). We find that this 
impact is estimated at $6.49 per acre per year. As discussed, this scenario provides a lower bound for 
farmers’ welfare gains. For the “Keep Conventional” scenario, the estimated farmers’ welfare gains 
are larger. The estimated gains per acre of inside goods are $9.98 per year, a figure that rises to $19.97 
per year for the “Naïve” scenario (as noted, an upper bound for farmers’ welfare gains). 
The remainder of Table 11 investigates how the estimated welfare gains changed over time. 
In addition to the results for the entire 1996-2011 period, in this table we also report results for the 
1996-2000, 2001-2006, and 2007-2011 subperiods. We see clearly that the estimated welfare gains 
increased over time. When expressed in terms of inside products, for the “Keep Best” scenario the 
welfare gains increase from $1.81 per acre per year in 1996-2000 to $11.24 per acre per year in 2007-
2011. This trend is common to the other scenarios as well, with the estimated welfare gains rising to 
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$14.76 per acre of inside goods per year for the “Keep Conventional” scenario, and to $33.10 per acre 
per year for the “Naïve” scenario, in the 2007-2011 period. 
6.4. GE Traits and Seed Industry Revenue 
Farmers’ willingness to pay a premium for GE traits is equivalent to an upward shift in the demand 
facing seed companies. Hence, the ability to bundle GE traits with traditional germplasm holds the 
potential for seed companies to increase prices and boost revenue. In our modeling, we maintain that 
the hedonic price function estimated in section 6.2 is capturing, in a reduced-form way, equilibrium 
prices in the corn and soybean seed market. Hence, we can use the estimated counterfactual prices to 
infer the increase in revenues, due to the ability to commercialize GE traits, that accrued to the seed 
industry. To compute the benchmark seed revenues we compute the market shares, and associated 
value of all seed sold, by using the fitted prices of equation (15) along with the estimated seed demand 
model. For the counterfactual scenario of no GE traits, we compute market shares by using the 
counterfactual prices of equation (16) along with the estimated demand model. For the latter, similar 
to the computation of farmers’ welfare, we need to take a stand on the choice set that farmers would 
have faced had GE innovations not occurred. Hence, we again report three possible scenarios, the 
“keep best,” “keep conventional,” and “Naïve” approaches.  
Table 12 reports the estimated additional revenues for seed manufacturers. Focusing on the 
“keep best” scenario, we find that over the entire 1996-2011 period, seed firms’ sales were greater by 
nearly $23 billion, with $14.1 billion coming from soybeans and $8.9 billion from corn. Moreover, the 
additional revenue from GE traits increased over time, reflecting the increased adoption of GE seed 
varieties and, possibly, changing equilibrium pricing conditions (which, again, we are not modeling in 
a structural way). Over the last five years of our sample (2007-2011) we find that GE traits boosted 
seed industry revenue by a total of $13.9 billion, or approximately $2.8 billion per year, and corn 
contributed significantly more than soybeans to increasing seed industry revenues. This likely reflects 
the increase in farmers’ WTP for corn GE traits (possibly associated with the commodity price boom 
noted earlier), as well as the increased diffusion of Bt traits in corn varieties (recall Table 2).  
The estimated seed industry revenue increases reported in Table 12 are commensurable with 
the estimated increases in farmers’ expected profits reported in Table 11. Both measures can be 
interpreted as the ex post welfare gain from GE crops. The interpretation is somewhat different, 
though. For farmers, the figures in Table 11 can be interpreted as net welfare gains: these are the dollar 
value of how much better off farmers have been by their ability to purchase GE varieties—
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notwithstanding the fact that they had to pay a premium for GE seeds. For the seed industry, on the 
other hand, increased revenues can be interpreted as ex post returns to past investments in R&D 
activities.18 Still, comparing the magnitude of gains accruing to farmers and the seed industry we see 
that the latter has been fairly effective at capturing the value created by GE trait innovations. For 
example, over the last five years of the sample (2007-2011), for the “keep best” scenarios, farmers’ net 
welfare increased by $8.7 billion whereas the seed industry revenue increased by $13.9 billion. Thus, 
the seed industry appears to have been able to capture approximately three fifths of the overall 
monetary value of GE traits.  
7. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we assess the welfare implications of the diffusion of GE traits in U.S. corn and 
soybeans. We develop a two-level nested logit model of seed demand in which farmers choose the 
most profitable option among corn and soybean seed varieties (and an outside option). The nesting 
structure is specified such that at the upper level a farmer chooses whether to plant an inside option 
(corn or soybeans) or the outside option, and at the lower level she chooses whether to plant corn or 
soybeans. Conditional on this choice, the farmer chooses a particular seed product. Specifying the 
demand model in this way not only captures the important mechanism of corn-soybean rotations, but 
it also partially addresses one of the limitations, noted by Petrin (2002), of using the basic logit model 
to estimate the welfare impact of new products. 
 The model is estimated using a unique, large dataset on U.S. corn and soybean seed purchases 
during the 1996-2011 timeframe. Using the demand estimates, we find that farmers are willing to pay 
a significant premium for GE traits, and the extent of this willingness has increased significantly over 
time. We estimate the total net value of GE traits to farmers using counterfactual prices obtained from 
a reduced-form hedonic approach. Our counterfactual scenarios are adjusted to account for the fact 
GE crop varieties, over time, crowded out conventional varieties. More specifically, rather than simply 
removing a GE product from farmers’ choice sets, we also simulate scenarios in which modified GE 
                                                 
18 The implicit assumption, here, is that the marginal production cost to seed firms for GE and non-
GE varieties is the same. To put our estimates in context it may be helpful to consider the extent of 
R&D in this industry. For the five-year period 2007-2011, data reported by Phillips (2014) suggest 
that the R&D expenditure of the six largest agro-chemical firms, for the seed and GE trait segment, 
amounted to approximately $13 billion. As for individual companies, publicly available data for 
Monsanto are most informative because this company’s R&D is almost exclusively devoted to seeds 
and traits. Monsanto’s annual disclosures to the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission indicate a 
total of $5.45 billion in R&D expenditures for the 2007-2011 period.  
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products are retained in farmers’ counterfactual choice sets. In so doing, we avoid the bias that would 
result from conflating the removal of the GE technology with an artificial reduction in product 
diversity.  
Overall, our results suggest that both U.S. farmers and seed firms have enjoyed significant 
increases in surplus as a result of GE traits. In the most recent five-year sub-period of our analysis, 
2007-2011, our most conservative counterfactual scenario predicts that GE crops were responsible 
for about $8.7 billion of additional surplus for farmers and about $13.9 billion of additional revenue 
for seed firms. To the extent that the marginal production cost of GE varieties is approximately the 
same as the marginal production cost of non-GE varieties, this suggests that seed firms acquired 
approximately three fifths of the ex post surplus imputed to GE traits. We also note that the majority 
of farmer surplus, particularly prior to 2007, came from GT soybean (rather than GE corn) varieties.  
Our work has some important implications for the ongoing debate surrounding GE crops. 
First, our estimates suggest that, at least up to 2011, farmers still obtained significant net benefits from 
adopting GE crop varieties, notwithstanding the higher seed prices they paid. It is also notable that 
seed firms were able to extract the larger share of the ex post welfare effects of GE traits. 
Appropriability of ex post returns from innovation is essential to ensure that firms have continuing 
incentives to invest in R&D. This is particularly important in the modern seed industry, where private 
R&D funds have vastly exceeded public R&D investments in recent years (Clancy, Fuglie and Heisey 
2016). Methodologically, our approach to estimating welfare may be applied to settings in which new 
products tends to crowd out and replace existing products.  
 Some caveats are also worth noting in closing.  Our analysis of the welfare effects of GE crops 
pertains to their direct economic consequences for farmers and the seed industry. Welfare implications 
arising from possible external effects, such as unintended environmental effects, are obviously not 
encompassed by our methodology. Also, our framework does not capture the possible impact of GE 
trait adoption on crop output prices, which precludes a fuller welfare impact assessment. Finally, a 
structural representation of the supply side might be preferable to the reduced-form approach used in 
this paper. This, however, would require a model that accommodates the complex web of GE trait 
cross-licensing agreements between seed firms, an undertaking that we leave for future studies.   
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Table 1. Market Shares in the U.S. Corn and Soybean Seed Industry, 2000-2015 
 




 2000-03 2004-07 2008-11 2012-15 
CORN     
   Monsanto 11.2% 21.4% 34.0% 35.4% 
   DuPont 36.0% 31.3% 31.5% 35.4% 
   Syngenta 4.7% 10.3% 7.5% 5.7% 
   Dow AgroSciences 5.2% 3.6% 4.1% 5.7% 
   AgReliant 2.5% 4.8% 6.0% 6.8% 
   Local & Regional Companies 40.5% 28.6% 16.9% 11.1% 
SOYBEANS     
   Monsanto 21.9% 23.4% 28.2% 27.6% 
   DuPont 19.9% 24.9% 29.3% 33.3% 
   Syngenta 3.4% 10.4% 10.5% 10.0% 
   Dow AgroSciences 1.9% 1.6% 1.9% 4.8% 
   AgReliant 1.1% 1.9% 1.8% 3.1% 
   Local & Regional Companies 41.8% 36.0% 26.8% 18.6% 
   Public/Saved Seed 10.0% 1.8% 1.4% 2.7% 
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Table 2. Adoption Rates for U.S. Corn and Soybeans (% of planted acres) 
 
Year 
Soybeans ----  Corn Single Traits  ----- -----------    Corn stacked traits  ---------------- 
GT GT CB RW GT-CB GT-RW CB-RW GT-CB-RW 
1996 2.8%  0.7%      
1997 14.7%   5.0%       
1998 46.7% 0.7% 17.6%  0.0%    
1999 59.5% 2.4% 21.0%  0.1%    
2000 68.7% 3.4% 21.3%  0.3%    
2001 81.1% 4.9% 19.9%  1.0%    
2002 88.2% 7.0% 24.3%  2.1%    
2003 89.8% 8.7% 25.7% 0.3% 3.9%  0.0% 0.0% 
2004 89.6% 12.1% 25.0% 1.0% 7.2% 0.6% 0.1% 0.0% 
2005 93.1% 15.5% 24.1% 1.3% 12.8% 1.2% 0.8% 1.0% 
2006 96.2% 17.8% 19.2% 1.6% 15.9% 1.9% 2.2% 4.9% 
2007 96.0% 18.1% 14.7% 0.6% 20.6% 2.1% 2.8% 18.3% 
2008 97.2% 18.9% 6.4% 0.1% 20.1% 0.8% 2.4% 36.9% 
2009 95.5% 19.4% 4.8% 0.0% 16.6% 0.3% 2.5% 45.0% 
2010 95.5% 19.8% 2.1% 0.0% 14.5% 0.3% 1.1% 50.7% 
2011 96.4% 18.9% 1.2% 0.0% 16.3% 0.5% 0.5% 53.8% 
Mean 75.7% 10.5% 14.6% 0.3% 8.2% 0.5% 0.8% 13.2% 




Table 3. Seed Prices for U.S. Corn and Soybeans ($/acre) 
 
Year 
----  Soybeans  ---- Corn ---  Corn Single Traits  --- ----------------  Corn stacked traits  ----------------- 
Non-GE GT Non-GE GT CB RW GT-CB GT-RW CB-RW GT-CB-RW 
1996 17.20 21.27 24.60  30.45      
1997 18.67 26.49 26.05  34.05      
1998 19.29 28.33 26.82 31.90 36.57  36.85    
1999 17.45 28.27 27.44 32.15 36.02  33.28    
2000 17.99 27.39 27.81 31.75 35.60  33.62    
2001 17.88 26.51 28.27 31.92 36.93  38.63    
2002 17.41 26.84 28.63 32.40 36.96  37.36   45.02 
2003 19.35 26.18 29.82 34.06 38.21 44.78 39.18  48.88 36.30 
2004 20.56 27.85 30.97 33.56 40.14 43.47 40.08 44.69 47.30 41.40 
2005 21.82 32.88 31.61 36.08 38.74 42.63 41.60 44.70 47.19 49.21 
2006 21.95 32.47 33.40 39.09 42.22 45.37 44.87 50.79 50.78 56.26 
2007 23.43 32.86 34.31 41.54 42.62 46.08 46.01 48.08 49.27 53.21 
2008 26.21 36.37 41.92 53.73 49.85 60.69 58.39 61.99 62.27 69.26 
2009 35.32 46.19 47.34 63.91 55.03 41.41 68.36 67.32 67.74 86.26 
2010 35.58 49.52 51.00 68.15 62.74 41.77 72.12 65.70 74.47 89.81 
2011 40.62 49.70 53.86 68.69 67.42 66.21 75.09 86.25 70.72 91.32 
Mean 23.17 32.44 33.99 42.78 42.72 48.05 47.53 58.69 57.62 61.81 





Table 4. Top Brands in Corn and Soybeans, 1996-2011 
 
  ------  Corn  ------ ---  Soybeans  --- 
Brand Parent Company(a) Share(b) Price(c) Share(b) Price(c) 
Agrigold Agreliant 1.88% 48.35 -- -- 
LG Seeds Agreliant 1.00% 46.50 0.76% 32.74 
Beck’s Hybrids Beck’s Hybrids 1.07% 46.83 1.38% 36.95 
Croplan Croplan Genetics 1.66% 47.09 2.59% 33.74 
Mycogen Dow Agrosciences 3.55% 38.32 1.75% 28.13 
Pioneer DuPont 33.76% 43.21 23.86% 32.98 
Asgrow Monsanto 1.88% 34.57 16.74% 33.32 
Dekalb Monsanto 14.89% 57.18 4.75% 27.93 
Fielder’s Choice Monsanto 1.68% 31.63 0.17% 44.57 
Kruger Monsanto 0.49% 51.77 1.49% 28.64 
Public Public / Universities --  2.16% 15.32 
Stine Stine Seed 0.37% 42.49 2.92% 29.17 
Garst Syngenta 3.80% 37.68 2.12% 27.60 
Golden Harvest Syngenta 3.30% 39.01 1.85% 26.36 
NK Seeds Syngenta 4.62% 37.88 6.94% 34.90 
Notes. (a) Parent company as of 2011. (b) Average share over the period considered (crop-specific 
percent of acres grown).  (c) Average price ($/acre) of the entire period.  





Table 5.  Average Number of Seed Products in a CRD 
 
Year Total Corn Soybean Corn with GE traits 
Soybeans with 
GE traits 
1996 10.8 6.5 4.3 0.3 0.4 
1997 12.7 7.2 5.5 1.0 1.5 
1998 15.0 8.1 7.0 2.0 3.2 
1999 16.8 9.3 7.5 3.0 4.0 
2000 18.7 10.4 8.3 4.1 4.7 
2001 18.5 10.8 7.7 4.6 5.0 
2002 18.0 11.1 6.9 5.3 4.9 
2003 18.3 12.1 6.2 6.4 4.7 
2004 19.7 13.6 6.1 8.3 4.7 
2005 23.3 16.6 6.8 11.6 5.4 
2006 28.2 21.4 6.8 16.2 6.0 
2007 29.7 23.2 6.5 18.8 5.7 
2008 27.9 21.7 6.2 18.1 5.6 
2009 26.8 20.6 6.2 17.5 5.3 
2010 23.5 17.3 6.2 14.7 5.3 
2011 22.9 16.7 6.2 14.6 5.4 




Table 6. Estimated Parameters of Seed Demand Models 
 
 Nested Logit Basic Logit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price -0.0227 -0.0151    -0.0403    -0.0049    
 (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0028) (0.0005) 
     
1σ   0.8394 0.7983
      
 (0.0090) (0.0089)   
     
2σ   0.3444 0.5985
      
 (0.0572) (0.0187)   
     
Soy GT Trait 0.436 0.3627    1.2950    0.8182    
 (0.0333) (0.0215) (0.0433) (0.0214) 
     
Corn GT Trait 0.2101 0.1225    0.2347    -0.1380    
 (0.0219) (0.0135) (0.0330) (0.0149) 
     
Corn RW Trait 0.2216 0.1473    0.4079    0.0229 
 (0.0233) (0.0152) (0.0359) (0.0189) 
     
Corn CB Trait 0.1755 0.1064    0.1894    -0.1179    
 (0.0184) (0.0114) (0.0281) (0.0140) 
     
Soy Dummy  -0.2354    -0.5366    -0.0294 
  (0.0202) (0.0450) (0.0206) 
Elasticities:     
Own  -7.038 -3.749 -2.109 -0.254 
Cross: Within Crop 0.483 0.219 0.036 0.004 
Cross: Across Crop 0.049 0.068 0.036 0.004 
Cross: Outside Good 0.020 0.013 0.036 0.004 
IVs? Yes Yes Yes No 


















Table 7. Additional Results for the Nested Logit Model 
 
 (1)  (2)  
Price -0.0210    (0.0024) -0.0214    (0.0024) 
1σ   0.8468
    (0.0089) 0.8005    (0.0108) 
2σ   0.3750
    (0.0564) 0.3143    (0.0593) 
Soy GT Trait 0.4064    (0.0352)   
Corn GT Trait 0.2212    (0.0290)   
Corn RW Trait 0.2402    (0.0319)   
Corn CB Trait 0.1938    (0.0261)   
Multiple Traits -0.0797    (0.0181)   
Soy GT Trait, 1996-2000   0.3576    (0.0400) 
Soy GT Trait, 2001-2006   0.5008    (0.0387) 
Soy GT Trait, 2007-2011   0.5289    (0.0382) 
Corn GT Trait, 1996-2000   0.0385 (0.0412) 
Corn GT Trait, 2001-2006   0.0870    (0.0280) 
Corn GT Trait, 2007-2011   0.3583    (0.0341) 
Corn RW Trait, 2001-2006   0.1212    (0.0361) 
Corn RW Trait, 2007-2011   0.1275    (0.0277) 
Corn CB Trait, 1996-2000   0.2634    (0.0270) 
Corn CB Trait, 2001-2006   0.0427 (0.0429) 
Corn CB Trait, 2007-2011   0.2836    (0.0305) 
Multiple Traits, 1996-2000   -0.0352 (0.0981) 
Multiple Traits, 2001-2006   -0.0297 (0.0231) 
Multiple Traits, 2007-2011   -0.1567    (0.0210) 
Elasticities:     
Own  -6.819  -5.365  
Cross: Within Crop 0.470  0.353  
Cross: Across Crop 0.049  0.043  
Cross: Outside Good 0.019  0.019  
 




Table 8. Average Own and Cross Price Elasticities 
 
 1996-2001 2001-2006 2007-2011 
Own -4.17 -4.72 -5.90 
Cross: Within Crop  0.39  0.31  0.31 
Cross: Across Crop  0.05  0.04  0.04 
Cross: Outside Good  0.02  0.02  0.02 






Table 9.  Willingness-to-Pay for GE Products (2011 $/acre) 
 
Trait(s) 1996-2000 2001-2006 2007-2011 
Soy GT 16.68 23.35 24.66 
Corn GT 1.79 4.05 16.71 
Corn CB 5.65 5.94 12.28 
Corn RW  1.99 13.23 
Corn GT-CB 5.8 8.62 21.68 
Corn GT-RW  4.67 22.62 
Corn CB-RW  6.55 18.2 
Corn GT-CB-RW   10.6 34.91 




Table 10.  Hedonic Prices  
 
 Parameter Standard Error 
Soybean Post GE -1.2312 (0.6828) 
Corn Post GE -1.1468    (0.3665) 
Soybean GT Trait, 1996-2000 15.4104    (0.2395) 
Soybean GT Trait, 2001-2006 13.8282    (0.2407) 
Soybean GT Trait, 2007-2011 11.4178    (0.3637) 
Corn GT Trait, 1996-2000 11.4448    (0.4602) 
Corn GT Trait, 2001-2006 10.2212    (0.1903) 
Corn GT Trait, 2007-2011 13.2222    (0.1794) 
Corn Borer Trait, 1996-2000 12.9633    (0.2579) 
Corn Borer Trait, 2001-2006 10.2924    (0.1785) 
Corn Borer Trait, 2007-2011 9.5252    (0.2287) 
Root Worm Trait, 2001-2006 15.0868    (0.2961) 
Root Worm Trait, 2007-2011 11.5209    (0.1978) 
Multiple Traits Stack, 96-00 -7.5897    (1.6405) 
Multiple Traits Stack, 01-06 -5.9030    (0.2988) 
Multiple Traits Stack, 07-11 -4.5201    (0.2994) 
N 79,260  
R2 0.686  
 
The model was estimated with crop-year, crop-brand, and crop-CRD fixed effects, which are not 





Table 11.  Estimated Farmers’ Welfare Gains Associated with GE Traits (2011 $) 
 
 
  Keep Best Keep Conventional Naïve 








All Products 14,670 2.67 22,384 4.07 43,353 7.88 
Inside Products 14,895 6.49 22,910 9.98 44,926 19.97 
Soybeans 10,689 10.33 13,388 12.93 21,703 24.12 
Corn 4,761 3.78 9,980 7.93 16,768 13.62 
1996-2000 
All Products 1,164 0.68 2,738 1.59 3,411 1.98 
Inside Products 1,162 1.81 2,757 4.28 3,492 5.43 
Soybeans 934 3.42 1,800 6.59 2,318 8.48 
Corn 258 0.70 1,035 2.79 1,141 3.08 
2001-2006 
All Products 4,817 2.33 8,340 4.03 14,363 6.94 
Inside Products 4,877 5.65 8,530 9.88 15,364 17.80 
Soybeans 4,511 11.11 5,788 14.26 9,683 23.86 
Corn 668 1.46 2,981 6.52 4,094 8.95 
2007-2011 
All Products 8,689 5.06 11,305 6.58 25,579 14.90 
Inside Products 8,855 11.24 11,623 14.76 26,070 33.10 
Soybeans 5,244 14.73 5,800 16.30 9,702 27.26 





Table 12.  Estimated Additional Seed Industry Revenues Due to GE Traits (2011 $ millions)  
 




Soybeans 14,105 14,016 21,738 
Corn 8,846 11,939 11,653 
Total  22,951 25,955 33,391 
1996-2000 
Soybeans 1,983 2,274 2,682 
Corn 37 274 111 
Total  2,020 2,548 2,793 
2001-2006 
Soybeans 6,779 6,809 10,027 
Corn 286 1,634 -44 
Total  7,064 8,443 9,983 
2007-2011 
Soybeans 5,343 4,933 9,029 
Corn 8,524 10,030 11,586 
Total  13,867 14,964 20,615 
 
